Nichiren Shoshu of America Collection

NSA Quarterly · Spring 1977

Rights: Seeking a New Definition

NSA Quarterly, Spring 1977, pp. 45–48. World Tribune Press, Santa Monica.

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This text has been checked and corrected against the printed magazine. The Japanese-language sections of each issue are not included.

We live in a “legal” world. Laws of one kind or another permeate every aspect of our existence. Some we like, some we don’t, and most we simply live with. In America, we are fortunate enough to assume that most of the laws of the land are for our benefit, to protect our rights and property, and to enable us to live together in a modicum of harmony. But we are increasingly aware that these laws are in constant flux. As they expand, in numbers and consequence, there is a corresponding contraction in our lives, on our freedom to do and to live as we see fit. Once we could afford to be fairly oblivious to the laws. They were basic and we could follow them almost instinctively. Today, ignorance of the law and our rights can be hazardous and expensive in ways our grandparents might never have imagined. The following University Club article is a good case in point. Later on, the Quarterly talks to some members of a group of legal professionals in an effort to clarify all this for us, common people who may be often mystified by the complexities of the law.

Legal scholars in recent years have proposed as the effective solution to environmental pollution that the natural object itself — whether it be a tree, a lake, or a stream — be granted standing and a voice in court through a spokesperson. This imaginative theory which was aired in the Southern California Law Review in spring, 1972, was quoted and relied upon by Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas in his dissenting opinion in Sierra Club v. Rogers C.B. Morton, Secretary of the Interior.

Economist John Maynard Keynes once said that “a study of the history of opinion is a necessary preliminary to the emancipation of the mind.” Once we become aware of all that is indefensible in the mental baggage of our ancestors, we begin to doubt that which the status quo now deems quite proper.

In discovering the hidden implications of the terms “rights” and “property,” much can be found in the ancient myths of Homer. When Odysseus returned from the wars in Troy, he hanged a dozen slave-girls whom he suspected of misbehavior during his absence. It involved no question of impropriety. The girls were property. This disposal of property was then, as now, a matter of expediency, not right and wrong.

There is as yet no ethic dealing with human relationship to land and the animals and plants which grow upon it. Land, like Odysseus’ slave girls, is still just property. Our land-relation is strictly economic, entailing privileges, not obligations.

Much interest developed during the extended legal battle involving the U.S. Forest Service’s grant of permit for Walt Disney Enterprises, Inc. to develop Mineral King Valley, a wilderness area in California’s Sierra Nevada Mountains.

Plans included a $35 million complex of motels, restaurants, and recreational facilities. The Sierra Club, maintaining that the project would adversely affect the area’s aesthetic and ecological balance, sought an injunction. The appellate court’s opinion did not deal with the Forest Service’s right in granting the permit, but that the Sierra Club had no “standing” to bring the question to the courts. The court reasoned that the Sierra Club itself is not “adversely affected” within the meaning of the rules of jurisdictional standing.

The injury to the Sierra Club was slim, but the damage to Mineral King — the park itself — wasn’t. However, there was no one who could legally protest. If the courts would begin to think about the park itself as a jural person — the way corporations are “persons” — the notion of nature having rights would make significant headway.

On April 19, 1972 the Mineral King decision was upheld by the United States Supreme Court. Of the nine justices, Powell and Rehnquist did not participate. They, like the defendant, Secretary Morton, were recent appointees of President Nixon. The bare majority of four to three affirmed the lower court decision on the tenuous ground that the argument the minority preferred was not technically raised by the plantiff’s attorneys. The Southern California Law Review article appeared after the arguments were closed and while the justices were considering the case.

With that type of photo-finish litigation as a start, the need for updating our natural property concepts was greatly encouraged. As always, the obstacle to the progression of understanding is the unwillingness to think the unthinkable. But a brief sketch of our history reveals that we have boldly and repeatedly done just that.

Persons we presently regard as the natural holders of at least some rights once had none at all. Take children as an example. Infanticide was widely practiced and sanctioned in early Greek and Roman civilizations. Senicide, as among the North American Indians, was the corresponding rightlessness of the aged. The rights of children, still limited, were recently expanded when the Supreme Court guaranteed basic constitutional protections to juvenile defendants. We have also expanded the rights of prisoners, aliens, women (especially married), the insane, blacks, fetuses, and Indians.

It is not only humans that are now recognized as the possessors of rights. The world of law is inhabited with inanimate rightholders: trusts, corporations, joint ventures, and nation-states, to mention just a few. But the notion of a corporation as a “person” was quite jarring to early jurists in America.

Throughout legal history, each successive extension of rights to some new entity was previously a bit unthinkable. The United States Supreme Court straight-facedly told us in Dred Scott that blacks were to be denied citizenship “as a subordinate and inferior class of beings.”

Similarly, in an early Massachusetts case for the wrongful death of a human fetus, the highest court of that commonwealth found it inconceivable that “a man might owe a civil duty and incur a conditional liability to one not yet in being.”

Another interesting case deals with the first attempt of a woman to practice law in Wisconsin. As a matter of law, she was destined to “the nurture of children and for the custody of the home.”

The fact is, each time there is a movement to confer rights onto some new entity, the proposal is bound to sound odd, frightening, or laughable. Proposing that we give legal rights to forests, oceans, rivers, and to the natural environment itself doesn’t mean that one should not be allowed to cut down a tree. Someone must determine the relative benefits to be gained.

To have a legally recognizable worth and dignity, a holder of rights should be able to enjoy three main benefits of the “majesty of the law.” They are first, the thing can institute legal actions at its behest; second, in determining the granting of legal relief, the court must take injury to it into account; and, third, relief must run to the benefit of it.

By way of illustration, compare the cases of two societies in which pre-natal injury to a live-born child gives a right of action against an injuring party at the mother’s instance; for the mother’s benefit; on the basis of the mother’s anguish. The other gives the child a suit in its own name (through a guardian) for its own sake.

A right is not, as most people would think, some strange substance that one either has or has not. One’s life, right to vote, and property can all be taken away. Those who would infringe on another’s right must go through certain procedures. These procedures are the measure of what we value as a society. Some of the most important questions of “right” thus turn into questions of degree. How much review, and of which sort, will which agencies of state accord us when we claim our “right” is being infringed?

Even if certain rights were vested in natural objects, the political realities of the day could work within the systems of governmental agencies and judicial review to defeat them. But a society in which it is stated, however vaguely, that “rivers have legal rights” would evolve a different legal system than one which did not employ that expression, even if the two of them started with the very same legal rules.

The balance within our natural environment is incredibly delicate. Thus the problems that our technology create will not be easily solved. Very likely, they can be solved only through a willingness to suspend increases in the earth’s standard of living and by stabilizing the total human population.

In a conversation with renowned historian Arnold J. Toynbee, President Daisaku Ikeda of Soka-Gakkai International cautioned that it is still the majority of the citizens who are at once the guilty parties and the victims. A complete solution to the problem of polluting the environment, he urged, would involve each citizen striving to reform himself by strictly examining his daily life and eliminating acts that are liable to contribute to pollution.

Assuming that this type of restraint cannot socially be applied but that it must arise from the independent self-awareness of the individual, President Ikeda suggested the following concrete actions: first, limit consumption of physical materials to a minimum and devise ways to use waste products in production; second, make maximum use of the physical energy of the human body (In addition to reducing pollution and conserving resources, this step will promote and maintain greater human health); third, be cautious about the unlimited use of medicines, additives to foods, and other chemical products, and be aware that harm almost invariably accompanies whatever good these substances do.

Dr. Toynbee agreed with President Ikeda that for a movement of this sort to be effective, it must have a strong spiritual basis, namely, the power of religion. President Ikeda felt that the kind of religion needed must make each individual deeply aware of two important things: that the life-force of a single person is more important than all the material wealth of the world and the equally important principle that both life and its inherent dignity can be supported only in harmony with nature.

These sentiments are not new, nor are they limited to the thoughts of religious leaders. In joining the Supreme Court Justices Douglas and Brennan in their dissent to the Sierra Club v. Morton decision, Justice Blackmun referred to the old and particularly pertinent observation and warning of John Donne:

No man is an Iland, intire of itselfe; Every man is a peece of the Continent, a part of the maine; if a Clod bee washed away by the Sea, Europe is the lesse, as well as if a Promontorie were, as well as if a Mannor of thy friends or of thine owne were; any man’s death diminishes me, because I am involved in Mankinde; and therefore never send to know for whom the bell tolls: it tolls for thee.

— Devotions XVII.

[1. See Stone, U.S.C. Law Review, Vol. 45, P. 450]

[2. Ibid, p. 460]

[After receiving his B.A. in Business Management from Golden Gate University, Steve MacDonald became a J.D. candidate at the Golden Gate University School of Law. He previously spent three years at Fordham University and for several years was a legal assistant in the overseas military. Married and the father of a young son, Steve is an active member of NSA in San Francisco.]